And now the fifth installment of the history of the 3rd Eskadron/2 Chevauleger Regiment. This covers the German 1918 Spring Offensive from March 21, 1918 through April 6, 1918 and this is just the first part, more will follow. What is interesting is that the 3 Eskadron's primary mission was communications, most principally acting as dispatch riders. Other tasks were assisting with telephones and carrier pigeons. Unfortunately, not much hard information about the 3rd Eskadron is given so one really has to search for those occasional "nuggets" of useful information.
From a living history/reenactment perspective, the most useful tasks that could be performed during an event would be acting as messengers, manning field telephones, and perhaps acting as Feldgendarmerie. As the unit grows and develops, one or several of these activities will be incorporated in to what we do as a unit. Naturally, as more information is discovered, this is subject to change. For now, enjoy an interesting piece of history- it is doubtful that this has ever been previously translated into English and it's highly unlikely that this history has been actually read by anyone in the past 50 to 70 years (or at least I'd like to think so). It's truly a find.
Horrido!
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The Battle for France: March 21, 1918 - April 6, 1918
During January and February the command authorities and
staffs began to feverishly prepare for the great attack with the strictest
secrecy under the code name “Michael”. As with mobilization in peacetime, the
battle had been prepared with German thoroughness and conscientiousness. Equally,
the assault divisions were eagerly training to operate in this greatest of all
battles. From February 25, 1918 on, the commands proceeded with organizing the
accommodations and preparations for the attack in the deployment area. On 14
March, the assault divisions were ordered into their assembly areas. In order
to avoid detection from the air, all the troop movements were performed at
night. So moved the 6
th Bavarian Infantry Division and the 3
rd
Squadron in night marches through Mir (?),
Waziers,
Sin
le Noble and went into a bivouac at
Hamel,
where it arrived during the night of March 19/March 20.
During the time that diversionary attacks were being made on
other fronts, the 17, 2, and 18 Armies attacked along the general line of
Bullecourt
(west
Cambrai)
–
La
Fere to break through at
Amiens
and attack the enemy force at
Abbeville.
The 6
th Bavarian Infantry Division assigned now to the 17
th
Army, Group Lewarde (General Command, XVIII Army Corps) and was in the second
attack behind the 234
th and 221
st Infantry Divisions at
Agincourt.
After a successful breakthrough, the 6
th Bavarian Infantry Division
was inserted into the gap between the two aforementioned divisions that had characterized
arise that had the group recoil Lewarde north to bring the east
Arras
standing enemy front light for shrouds. (?)
During the night of March 21, the dense fog that had fallen broke
at 3:30 am in the front. On the entire front, the tremendous fire of the German
artillery went first, the enemy was fighting back with gas and explosive
ammunition, and the lines of communication were occupied with gunfire. By 4:00
am, the fire spread to the enemy infantry positions. Thousands of minenwerfers
now joined this artillery fire at 9:40 am in front, supporting the infantry in the
attack, while the artillery "rolling fire" was time-controlled,
rolling forward precisely. The enemy artillery answered reluctantly and at the first
onset of the enemy was to be followed across the board over the rough field
funnel through enemy obstacles of their own infantry. Countless pioneer
companies were burdened and they succeeded only with great delay to pave the
way so that the infantry could move forward.
At 12:40 pm, after the 6th Bavarian Infantry
Division with the 6th and 10th Infantry Regiments was inserted
between the 234th and 221th Infantry Divisions, and had taken
Ecourt (?) to be advancing against Groifilles. Another advance was impossible
because our artillery could only follow each attack stage slowly.
The 3rd Squadron had to provide the infantry and artillery headquarters
staffs with sufficient dispatch riders reporting and to provide a number of police
patrols, who had the hugely important task of taking care of the accumulation
of forces ordered on the route of advance. In addition, the squadron led by
Captain Meyer initially [reporting to head had am Kocher dig spell](?) to
extend south to the extent of
Bullecourt
and
Ecourt
which had to follow, depending on the progression of the infantry by leaps and
bounds. The connection with the reporting of division staff chiefs had the
Division telephone detachment, the connection of signaling head with the
regiments and the artillery make the subject ends troops. The connection with
the reporting of the division staff chiefs was through the Division telephone detachment,
connecting the signaling chief with the regiments and the artillery and in the
end, the troops. Since the wire, which could not be set high (i.e., on poles) in
a short time, failed even in this attack as a result of enemy action and the
inevitable damage caused by our own vehicles, especially Raupenlaftkraft cars.
The burden of messaging rested on the entourage of all the technical equipment
(blinkers, radio operators, telephones, alarm dogs, pigeons) and finally ended
on the shoulders of our brave dispatch riders.
The command had secure internal reporting channels and in important
cases, the orderly officers of the Division were usually using the officers of
our regiment. Lieutenant D. R. Wirth earned the Iron Cross First Class. The
message center acted as an advanced element, moving up in accordance with the
progression of the attack instead of the Division Headquarters (?).
In
crossing over the shelled area, especially with horses, it could only be
correctly termed as difficult as the entire field strength had to ride this
ordeal. First, our own deep trenches had to be overcome, then the terrain
between the two positions with a tangled mess of mutual wire obstacles and then
the enemy first position that was crisscrossed by deep trenches and churned thoroughly
with shell holes by the hour-long barrage [sat at shell hole](?).
In
addition, there was heavy enemy fire on the crossing points! Well the Pioneer
Companies struggled to put bridges over the trenches and corduroy roads to
provide with prepared material. However, it succeeded in doing so after a few
days; in just the first few hours, a movable way would have been crucial. By
the evening of 21 March only a few Feldgeschüke (artillery piece of some type?)
had come slowly and with unspeakable exertions over the shelled area. The first
heavy Geschüke (?) could be pulled on March 23 only gradually. Undaunted and
unceasingly, our dispatch riders had to cross this desert with its snares. When
it was no longer possible to ride, they ran on foot with their messages.
On the
first day (March 21, 1918), Chevauleger Auernhammer
was
killed while acting as a dispatch rider at the 10
th Infantry
Regiment when his horse was wounded in the leg by a grenade. On March 24, Chevauleger
Donauer
was wounded by shrapnel in the shoulder. The fallen and the divisional staff
and their baggage were located in Ecourt and Lt. Schmid was in command of the
division headquarters. At night, there was gas throughout the bivouac area.
Frequently these bivouac areas had to be changed due to enemy fire.
Food,
especially for the horses, was extremely difficult to obtain; roughage did not
exist. Water was supplied by specific cars. In the enemy's position itself,
there was little to be found. The whole supply of munitions and food moved
along the only route of advance for the two divisions, which was only passable
at long intervals and with great difficulty. Ammunition was more important than
the food.
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| Page from the Official 2 Chevauleger Stammrolle for Chevauleger Auernhammer. |
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| Page from the Official 2 Chevauleger Stammroll for Chevauleger Donauer |
