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Showing posts with label organization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label organization. Show all posts

Monday, December 15, 2014

German Cavalry Regiments - From Jürgen Kraus


The following are notes based on my translations of passages from Jürgen Kraus’s 3-Volume Work Die feldgraue Uniformierung des deutschen Heeres 1907-1918, pp. 583-585. The translation was made via a computer translating program and as such, has its limitations. I have inserted question marks where I was unable to make sense of the translation. This is just a first attempt so please be patient, my knowledge of the German language is poor.
 
Cavalry Organization:

Cavalry regiments were composed of five squadrons[1] (three of the Bavarian Chevauleger Regiments only had four squadrons) and each regiment had a peacetime establishment of approximately 25 officers, 3 medical officers, 3 veterinary officers, and 750 enlisted men (privates and NCOs). During wartime, cavalry regiments went to the field with four squadrons while the fifth remained at home station (8 officers and 260 enlisted men) and were intended as a source of replacements for the other four squadrons.[2] In the field, the cavalry regiment had a wartime strength of 30 officers and 690 enlisted men. 

After the transition to trench warfare, there was hardly any use for cavalry while on the other hand, there was a great need for replacement horses for the existing artillery formations. Therefore, from October 1916 on, more and more cavalry regiments formally gave up their horses and were instead used for dismounted combat. From November 1917 on, these cavalry regiments received the designation of “Cavalry-Schützen-Regiment”[3] but retained their old active cavalry regimental designation.
 
By spring 1918, 53 cavalry regiments had been formally dismounted (designated as "Kavallerie-Schützen") and 19 Cavalry-Schützen-Regiments were dissolved by the war’s end due to large losses.


[1] A squadron would be equivalent to a company of infantry for organizational purposes. Unlike the US Army, German cavalry lacked the intermediate organizational unit of the battalion.
[2] The fifth squadron was designated as the “Ersatz Eskadron” while the four squadrons in the field were numbered 1 through 4.
[3] The formal term was “Kavallerie-Schützen-Regimenter” which translates into “Cavalry Rifle Regiments”. For ease of understanding, “Cavalry Schützen Regiment” will be used.

Friday, October 17, 2014

The 2 Chevauleger's Wartime Role

And so now you are probably wondering just what was the 2 Chevauleger Regiment doing during the First World War. To find out, click HERE for a document that should explain it.

A Note on Cavalry Organization

During the First World War era, cavalry was employed in two ways. First, cavalry regiments were grouped together in divisions and intended for use as a striking army. Second, each infantry division has cavalry assigned to it for use as a reconnaissance element, usually a regiment. As the war progressed, the cavalry divisions were either disbanded completely or they were dismounted for use as infantry.

For the Germans, the horses were assigned to the field artillery since the loss rate of horses was horrendous and horses were, for the most part, the only way to move guns. Also, the dismounted cavalry regiments were reorganized, having machine guns units assigned to them to increase their firepower. Also, by 1916, the divisional cavalry regiments were reduced to a single squadron with the other squadrons being assigned to newly-forming infantry divisions.

In future posts, I will be expanding on this some but that should give a basic idea of cavalry's position in the army.

Cavalry: Tactical and Strategic Use During the First World War, Part 1

When we go to public events, we often get the question "Didn't cavalry disappear after 1914, at least on the Western Front because of machine guns?" Well, the answer is yes (sort of) and no. There is no doubt that the days of the full-blown cavalry charge into massed infantry or guns was over and officers in all of the major armies recognized it, in spite of the protestations of more traditional-minded officers. The experiences of the Boer War, and to a lesser extent, the Russo Japanese War, had driven home the idea that cavalry's utility was in its ability to conduct scouting operations as a means of assessing the strength and location of enemy forces (a function that would be ultimately supplemented by aerial reconnaissance). Also, to a lesser extent, cavalry was still useful for conducting raids against the enemy's logistics infrastructure or attacking targets of opportunity.

The one major lesson drawn from the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars was that now cavalry was basically nothing more than mobile infantry that would use their horses to get to a particular position and then dismount and fight. It was this last idea that cavalry officers had a hard time grasping because it meant that cavalry as an arm of decision was no longer viable. The reality was that changes in technology and especially with the advent of rapid firing artillery and machine guns had negated the cavalry's function as being the arm of decision. At best, fighting would be between cavalry forces as each attempted to prevent the other side from fulfilling its scouting mission.

During the initial campaigns of the war, cavalry fulfilled its traditional role as the "eyes and ears" and there are numerous examples of this both on the Western and Eastern Fronts. And cavalry's failures were also amply demonstrated, especially when it failed to carry out its primary mission. For the Eastern Front, in the north were the remarkable Battle of Tannenberg and  the follow-on Battle of the Masurian Lakes which pretty much brought the Russian Army to a screeching halt, giving the Germans breathing space while they attempted to defeat the Allies in the West. To the south, the Russians, with the aid of Austrian military incompetence, managed to wreck the Austro-Hungarian Army and drive it back to the edge of the Carpathian Mountains. The Germans then attempted to relieve the Austrians by launching a drive on Warsaw that ultimately failed. By December, both sides were too exhausted to conduct any major military operations and the front settled down to a state of inactivity.

On the Western Front, the Germans narrowly missed defeating the French and gaining a decisive military decision with the Battle of the Marne and then through the Fall attempted to gain a decisive result during the feverish "Race to the Sea". In the end, the Germans failed due to a variety of factors and by December the front had stabilized with both sides too exhausted to conduct major military operations.

So what changed? Well, besides the overall exhaustion of the combatants on both fronts, there was the added problem on the Western Front that there were too many troops in relation to the existing space- the Western Front was roughly 465 miles long while the Eastern Front was over a 1,000 miles long. In the west, armies could easily concentrate firepower to defeat any frontal attack and flanks were non-existent.

German vs British cavalry charge, 1914. A somewhat idealized picture.


For cavalry, this pretty much meant that they would be unable to fulfill their major wartime mission of scouting. So what was left? Mostly rear area security operations, cooperating with the Feld Gendarmerie. As the war went on, the now idled cavalry was looked upon as a source of manpower for the infantry and the horses for the field artillery. Also, what reconnaissance operations that were conducted were now conducted on foot and the troopers functions pretty much as their infantry comrades.

In the east, the situation was more fluid and the scope for major cavalry operations remained. The front was never as solidified as was the case on the Western Front and once this thin shell was pierced, cavalry could be used to exploit and wreck havoc in the rear areas. This was especially the case when the Russians were able to successfully breech the Austrian front such as during the Brusiliov Offensive in 1916.

Russian cavalry charge, allegedly at Tannenberg in August 1914 but in reality it could have been anywhere on the Eastern Front once the front was breached.

So, in the end, on the Western Front cavalry never completely "disappeared" but rather its tactical and strategic role were redefined. The traditional rear area security operations never really changed and in the front lines, the cavalry acted in a dismounted role either performing reconnaissance operations in no-man's land or acting as a reserve to be thrown into the front line as needed.

However, it must be noted that even after the war attrition settled in on the Western Front, the British and French still maintained large bodies of cavalry up to division-size in the rear, waiting for the perfect opportunity to arise where they could be used to exploit any breech. There was some limited success with the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 and later battles in mid to late 1918 as the Germans fell back through Belgium.

British cavalry charge at Arras, 1918. With the horrendous casualties sustained during the Spring offensives, the German Army was exhausted and lacked the replacements to make good the losses. As the German Army weakened in mid 1918, the Allies were able to launch a number of offensives that steadily pushed the Germans back and opportunities for cavalry use increased although it could still be a hazardous undertaking.


For the Germans, they could not afford to keep large numbers of men and horses idle while fighting a multi-front war and suffering from the Allied blockade and having to lend greater amounts of assistance to the Austrians.

On the Eastern Front, as noted before, cavalry was able to maintain its traditional role to a greater extent with full-blown charges being done on occasion, With Russia's exit from the war in 1917, the Germans used cavalry to patrol the large expanses of their newly-won empire in the Ukraine, keeping a lid on the increasing turmoil generated by the Bolshevik Revolution until the Armistice.

There are never any absolutes in this is especially so with military matters and when it comes to cavalry. The key is to dig deeper with the research and make every effort to bring this information to light. For living history purposes, it helps to document that like the other branches of the German Army, the cavalry also evolved in its tactical and strategic roles and it is our job to bring these ideas to the public's view.

Horrido!


Monday, October 6, 2014

2 Chevauleger Organization

Like all military organizations, the 2 Chevauleger had a prescribed organization. While often times a unit's actual strength was much lower than its paper strength, it still is relevant in that it gives an idea of the organization's capabilities. Below is an organization chart for the 2 Chevauleger and compared to infantry organizations of an equivalent level (i.e. regiment and company), the cavalry was a lot smaller.


In the cavalry, there was no battalion level but rather the individual eskadrons, or squadrons, reported directly to regimental headquarters (the squadron was the equivalent of a company). Essentially, the 2 Chevauleger, like all Chevauleger regiments, consisted of four field squadrons and one depot squadron or Ersatz Eskadron. The Ersatz Eskadron remained back at the regiment's home station which was Regensburg and was responsible for the processing and training of new recruits.

Each squadron consisted of four platoons or zugs and each zug consisted of four eight-man sections or gruppe. The gruppe was the lowest level of organization. We portray a Gruppe belonging to the 3 Eskadron.