Flammenwerfers...

In an effort to gain a tactical advantage on the battlefield and ultimately break the deadlock of trench warfare, both the Central Powers and Allies sought various solutions. One such solution was the flame-thrower or flammenwherfer. The use in flame in war goes back to ancient times and one of the first recorded instances was the use of "Greek Fire" by the Byzantine Empire.

 

The composition of Greek fire was a state secret that has been lost and thus remains a matter of speculation and debate, with proposals including combinations of pine resin, naphtha, quicklime, calcium phosphide, sulfur, or niter. Byzantine use of incendiary mixtures was distinguished by the use of pressurized nozzles or siphōn to project the liquid onto the enemy. Because the substance was unstable, there was no practical way to employ it for land warfare thus it was employed as a naval weapon.

 

Greek Fire being employed in a naval battle.

Designs for flame-throwers were evaluated by the German Army as early as 1901 but it wasn't until the outbreak of the war and subsequent dealdlock on the Western Front that interest was revived. One of the first attacks was a lmited one made against the French at Verdun on February 26, 1915 and later on a more widespread basis against the British positions in the vicinity of Hooge, Belgium. The weapon's effects, besides the obvious one of burning the opposition, was it's psychological effect as a terror weapon- soldiers feared being burnt more than being shot and often they would quickly vacate their positions when there were flame-throwers in the vicinity. 

 

Below are some images of the later two-man M16 model. One man carried the tank and the other worked the nozzle. Basically, it worked on the principle of flamming fuel oil being projected by compressed nitrogen. There was an ignitor on the the end of the spray nozzle. Needless to say, anyone working one of these was an instant (and large) target for enemy fire.

 

A flame-thrower team consisted of three men with one carrying the tank, the other working the spray nozzle and the third to provide cover and assist as necessary. All the men were volunteers and organizational control was through the Pioneers. Flame-thrower teams were typically assigned to operate with the stosstruppen and were used in concert with machine-gun and rifle-armed infantry. The Flammenwerfer was one of many weapons used in tactical combination to rapidly neutralize and overwhelm the enemy. 

 

Two Flammenwerfer teams- It appears that they're in training.

Another training situation.

The M16 in a museum display. Not the bst image, unfortunately.

On the Western Front, 1917

Flammenwerfer team on the advance.

The unit disassembled.



In training, 1917.

   

GWHS Spring Battle - Post Mortum

Now that the Spring Battle is done with and I've had some time to think about it, the following are some observations/impressions of what occurred.

We assisted the Jaegers in defending their forward position on the right side of the Central Powers line. We've done this for the past two events and it seemed to be a good fit for us since both the Jaegers and us have been fielding low numbers. Also, it seemed that we were pretty much left alone and we could focus on providing support without getting directly drawn in.

Well, as I predicted, this changed with this battle. The right flank of the Central Powers line and our position was the center of focus for much of the Allies' efforts and especially with the Russians, assisted by the French and the Americans.

Making the situation worse, the Central Powers was seriously short-handed so we were forced to take up a defensive posture to the point where we were unable to maintain any sort of steady presence in no-man's land. This in turn allowed the Allies to take up positions relatively close to our sector with no fear of their plans being disrupted.

Worse, we had very few grenade simulators and what ones we had were made from wooden Easter eggs that proved to be too light to be able to be thrown far. In short, unless the enemy was directly on top of us, grenades were pretty much useless....

Which ties in with the Allied use of large quantities of smoke bombs capable of generating massive amounts of smoke (the smokes they used were of a variety meant for use in paintball and they're a short step down from the military issue M18 smoke grenades. In short, these were NOT the usual cheap firework stand variety smoke bombs that give off very little smoke.

The smoke was so intense that we had problems breathing and we were too busy trying to put out any fires to be able to devote ourselves to keeping alert for the enemy. The Allies were every quick in cutting through what barbed wire defenses there were (the front line had been extended with a cursory stringing of barbed wire that was in no adequate for the job).

With everything going on, it was impossible to deploy grenades and even basic shooting was impossible. And to top things off, the Russians were using a flamethrower (actually a glorified supersoaker done up to look semi period-correct). Basically, we were driven off the position and the Allies were able to punch through and reach the Central Powers main line.

It was a pretty dismal affair, there is no doubt about that. Bu at the same time, what did we learn from thins?

Well....

1. Better simulators- We need better grenade simulators and specifically, potato-masher grenades. These are not the easiest to reproduce but they have the heft to be thrown further and with luck, we can use these to disrupt their assaults.
   
   
2. Tactical positions- Integrating the forward listening/observation posts with the main battle line so they can be reinforced and there's a way to either advance or retreat that doesn't require moving over open ground.
   
   
3. More and better wiring- What we had was inadequate for the job and it took little effort for the Allies to cut through the defenses and then rush the bunker directly.
   
4. Greater presence in no-man's land- A more aggressive policy in regard to no-man's land. We need to conduct periodic sweeps. We have be eliminated or drive back BUT at least the Allies will not be able to operate close to our lines in perfect safety with little fear of us doing anything.
   
5. Increased vigilance- it's all too easy to not be paying attention and while we're relaxing, the enemy is sneaking up on us.
   
   
6. Better overhead defenses- It's critical that further installation of overhead cover be completed in order to secure better defenses against flying smoke bombs, grenades, and flashers. This means overhead cover and a less exposed position.
   
   
7. And of course, having more people attending the event (pretty obvious).

So there it is. We got hammered hard and it was a good lesson on how NOT to defend an exposed position. Hopefully we can get this right by the next event!

Horrido!

Gas attack on the Central Powers lines.

The 2 Chevauleger's Wartime Role

And so now you are probably wondering just what was the 2 Chevauleger Regiment doing during the First World War. To find out, click HERE for a document that should explain it.

Cavalry: Tactical and Strategic Use During the First World War, Part 1

When we go to public events, we often get the question "Didn't cavalry disappear after 1914, at least on the Western Front because of machine guns?" Well, the answer is yes (sort of) and no. There is no doubt that the days of the full-blown cavalry charge into massed infantry or guns was over and officers in all of the major armies recognized it, in spite of the protestations of more traditional-minded officers. The experiences of the Boer War, and to a lesser extent, the Russo Japanese War, had driven home the idea that cavalry's utility was in its ability to conduct scouting operations as a means of assessing the strength and location of enemy forces (a function that would be ultimately supplemented by aerial reconnaissance). Also, to a lesser extent, cavalry was still useful for conducting raids against the enemy's logistics infrastructure or attacking targets of opportunity.

The one major lesson drawn from the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars was that now cavalry was basically nothing more than mobile infantry that would use their horses to get to a particular position and then dismount and fight. It was this last idea that cavalry officers had a hard time grasping because it meant that cavalry as an arm of decision was no longer viable. The reality was that changes in technology and especially with the advent of rapid firing artillery and machine guns had negated the cavalry's function as being the arm of decision. At best, fighting would be between cavalry forces as each attempted to prevent the other side from fulfilling its scouting mission.

During the initial campaigns of the war, cavalry fulfilled its traditional role as the "eyes and ears" and there are numerous examples of this both on the Western and Eastern Fronts. And cavalry's failures were also amply demonstrated, especially when it failed to carry out its primary mission. For the Eastern Front, in the north were the remarkable Battle of Tannenberg and  the follow-on Battle of the Masurian Lakes which pretty much brought the Russian Army to a screeching halt, giving the Germans breathing space while they attempted to defeat the Allies in the West. To the south, the Russians, with the aid of Austrian military incompetence, managed to wreck the Austro-Hungarian Army and drive it back to the edge of the Carpathian Mountains. The Germans then attempted to relieve the Austrians by launching a drive on Warsaw that ultimately failed. By December, both sides were too exhausted to conduct any major military operations and the front settled down to a state of inactivity.

On the Western Front, the Germans narrowly missed defeating the French and gaining a decisive military decision with the Battle of the Marne and then through the Fall attempted to gain a decisive result during the feverish "Race to the Sea". In the end, the Germans failed due to a variety of factors and by December the front had stabilized with both sides too exhausted to conduct major military operations.

So what changed? Well, besides the overall exhaustion of the combatants on both fronts, there was the added problem on the Western Front that there were too many troops in relation to the existing space- the Western Front was roughly 465 miles long while the Eastern Front was over a 1,000 miles long. In the west, armies could easily concentrate firepower to defeat any frontal attack and flanks were non-existent.

German vs British cavalry charge, 1914. A somewhat idealized picture.

For cavalry, this pretty much meant that they would be unable to fulfill their major wartime mission of scouting. So what was left? Mostly rear area security operations, cooperating with the Feld Gendarmerie. As the war went on, the now idled cavalry was looked upon as a source of manpower for the infantry and the horses for the field artillery. Also, what reconnaissance operations that were conducted were now conducted on foot and the troopers functions pretty much as their infantry comrades.

In the east, the situation was more fluid and the scope for major cavalry operations remained. The front was never as solidified as was the case on the Western Front and once this thin shell was pierced, cavalry could be used to exploit and wreck havoc in the rear areas. This was especially the case when the Russians were able to successfully breech the Austrian front such as during the Brusiliov Offensive in 1916.

Russian cavalry charge, allegedly at Tannenberg in August 1914 but in reality it could have been anywhere on the Eastern Front once the front was breached.

So, in the end, on the Western Front cavalry never completely "disappeared" but rather its tactical and strategic role were redefined. The traditional rear area security operations never really changed and in the front lines, the cavalry acted in a dismounted role either performing reconnaissance operations in no-man's land or acting as a reserve to be thrown into the front line as needed.

However, it must be noted that even after the war attrition settled in on the Western Front, the British and French still maintained large bodies of cavalry up to division-size in the rear, waiting for the perfect opportunity to arise where they could be used to exploit any breech. There was some limited success with the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 and later battles in mid to late 1918 as the Germans fell back through Belgium.

British cavalry charge at Arras, 1918. With the horrendous casualties sustained during the Spring offensives, the German Army was exhausted and lacked the replacements to make good the losses. As the German Army weakened in mid 1918, the Allies were able to launch a number of offensives that steadily pushed the Germans back and opportunities for cavalry use increased although it could still be a hazardous undertaking.

For the Germans, they could not afford to keep large numbers of men and horses idle while fighting a multi-front war and suffering from the Allied blockade and having to lend greater amounts of assistance to the Austrians.

On the Eastern Front, as noted before, cavalry was able to maintain its traditional role to a greater extent with full-blown charges being done on occasion, With Russia's exit from the war in 1917, the Germans used cavalry to patrol the large expanses of their newly-won empire in the Ukraine, keeping a lid on the increasing turmoil generated by the Bolshevik Revolution until the Armistice.

There are never any absolutes in this is especially so with military matters and when it comes to cavalry. The key is to dig deeper with the research and make every effort to bring this information to light. For living history purposes, it helps to document that like the other branches of the German Army, the cavalry also evolved in its tactical and strategic roles and it is our job to bring these ideas to the public's view.

Horrido!